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Abstract
The Ukraine crisis and the subsequent cooling of West-Russia relations has elicited a number of popular 
arguments as to the trajectory of the relationship, many of which are alarming and pessimistic. After 
acknowledging the current impasse that has emerged between the coalition of Western actors, Ukraine and 
Russia since the signing of the second Minsk agreement in early 2015, this article speculates three medium- 
term scenarios for the West-Russia relationship in the context of Eastern Europe. An optimal scenario whereby 
the relationship is reset along complementary trade and energy interests, a suboptimal scenario which would 
see the development of a New Cold War, and a pragmatic middle option that reduces the shared 
neighbourhood, especially Ukraine, to a Finland-style buffer state are offered. Of the three presented scenarios, 
it is argued that because Russia is prepared to pay a higher cost than the West, right now, it will likely end up 
with a more favourable outcome (the pragmatic scenario) than the rest.
Policy Recommendations
The pragmatic scenario is desirable when the difficulty of achieving the optimal scenario and the 
lose-lose nature of the suboptimal scenario are factored in.
For the West: Understanding the high price Russia is willing to pay to assert its hegemony in its near 
abroad is imperative to developing a coherent and viable strategy.
For Russia: Realising the long-term costs of its aggressive actions in Ukraine and more broadly in its 
near abroad is urgently required.
A commitment to greater European security integration by the West -  whether through NATO, the 
EU or a new institution altogether -  could reduce Russia's bargaining power significantly in the long 
term.
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Introduction
Finding solutions to the Ukraine crisis and the 
subsequent cooling of West-Russia relations 
remains a conundrum for practitioners and 
scholars alike.1 Something of an impasse has 
emerged since the signing of the second 
Minsk Agreement on the 11th of February 
2015 which has meant that the questions of 
Ukraine and the West-Russia relationship 
remain open-ended. Much uncertainty 
envelopes the geopolitics of Eastern Europe 
with many of the key actors in this setting 
facing significant internal challenges which 
potentially affect the medium-to-long term 
trajectories of West-Russia relationship in 
Eastern Europe. The European Union (EU) is 
not only struggling to be a coherent 
international actor, especially with regards to 
its Eastern frontier, its very future remains 
shrouded in doubt (Gehring et al., 2017; 
Patomaki, 2017). The United States had been 
undertaking a pivot to Asia before the 
Ukraine crisis, but since the election of 
Donald Trump, few confident assumptions 
can be forwarded about the direction of 
American foreign policy; all of which has 
large implications for NATO (Cooper, 2014;
1 Here the West is used to denote the United States, 
the European Union, EU member states,
and NATO.
Kaufman, 2017). Russia is a state in decline -  
whether economic, social, political or as an 
international power -  but as its power to 
shape international politics dissipates, its 
regional focus has intensified which has 
raised fears about what its end goal is in 
Eastern Europe (Neumann, 2015; Wohlforth 
and Zubok, 2017).
Certainly, the current state of affairs tends to 
generate more pessimistic than optimistic 
predictions for the medium term future of 
Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and the West-Russia 
relationship. However, the West-Russia 
relationship is not necessarily pre-ordained 
to remain quagmired in a pessimistic, 
competitive, and antagonistic setting, 
despite the popularity of such an argument 
in the current discourse.2 West-Russia 
relations in their shared neighbourhood are 
complex and involve a multitude of variables 
ranging from systemic power distribution 
globally and regionally; the role identities 
and ideologies of the key actors, the 
decision-makers' perceptions; and the 
unique foreign policy-making processes, to 
name but a few. Thus, while relations are 
clearly quite competitive right now, there is 
no guarantee that this will become the new
2 Mainstream media publications such as The 
Economist, Time, Foreign Affairs, and Foreign Policy, 
among others, have all published articles predicting a 
further cooling of the West-Russia relationship.
6
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norm in West-Russia relations. Using a 
neoclassical realist analytical framework, this 
article examines three of the most likely 
scenarios -  positioned along a continuum 
from optimal to suboptimal -  and then 
examines which of these is the most likely 
outcome in the medium term future.
Three plausible scenarios
The three plausible scenarios offered in this 
essay stem from the findings of a 
comprehensive historical analysis of the 
Ukraine crisis, especially the underpinning 
EU-Russia relationship, that culminated in 
the book: EU-Russian Relations and the 
Ukraine Crisis (Smith. 2016). This study was 
undertaken through employing a 
neoclassical realist theoretical framework. 
Neoclassical realism, in a nutshell, is a loose 
coalition of the structural realist focus on 
how the distribution of power affects 
international politics with the classical realist 
focus on how variables drive foreign policy 
outcomes at the state level (Rose, 1998).
The neoclassical realist framework guiding 
this research examined one external variable 
-  the Eastern Europe security complex -  and
two internal variables -  role identity and 
decision-makers' perceptions.
The external variable -  the Eastern Europe 
security complex -  is treated at as a systemic 
stimulus which exogenously helps drive the 
scope and ambition of a state's foreign 
policy. A regional security complex, as 
defined by Buzan (2003), is a regional sub­
system of the broader international system in 
which the participating units (predominately 
sovereign states, but also, in some contexts, 
international organisations) have interlinked 
security perceptions and concerns. The 
regional setting is important -  arguably more 
so than the broader international setting -  
because "most political and military threats 
travel more easily over short distances than 
over long ones" so "insecurity is often 
associated with proximity" (Buzan, 2003, 
141). Furthermore, the more unstable the 
distribution of power within a regional 
system is, especially evident in unbalanced -  
i.e. no agreed security architecture3 -  bipolar 
and multipolar settings, the more likely states 
will be affected by the actions of the other, 
especially larger, members of the complex. In 
the context of West-Russia relations, it is 
argued that the Eastern Europe security
3 A security architecture is defined by Tow and Taylor 
(2010, 96) as an "overarching, coherent and 
comprehensive security structure for a geographically-
defined area, which facilitates the resolution of that 
region's policy concerns and achieves its security 
objectives."
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complex has been of great importance over 
the past 15 years: especially since the 
enlargement of NATO and the EU and the re­
emergence of an ambitious Russia in its near 
abroad (Smith, 2016).
The two internal variables examined, identity 
and perceptions, are treated as an interlinked 
intervening process -  an identity- 
perceptions framework -  which helps 
translate the systemic stimuli, via the 
domestic setting, into a foreign policy 
outcome. Identity -  namely, the values, 
beliefs, norms and assumptions which a state 
prioritizes for its international role -  acts as a 
kind of cognitive framework for decision­
makers; a filter which makes sense of the 
international system and how an entity 
should appropriately act within it (Juneau, 
2015, pp. 44-6). Perceptions, namely the 
perceptions held by decision-makers, of their 
state's relative power and other states' 
power, interests, and motivations are, unlike 
identity, not constrictive but rather swing the 
policy options available to a state (within the 
ideational parameters) based on their 
perceptive calculations (Juneau, 2015, p. 43). 
Thus, within the domestic foreign policy­
making process of states, it is argued that 
identity adds parameters of appropriate 
behaviour from which perceptions inform 
consequential policy recommendations.
Schweller (2004) developed a strain of 
neoclassical realism called "a theory of 
mistakes" because neoclassical realism helps 
a researcher, to a certain extent, explain 
suboptimal outcomes in foreign policy­
making, and, to a lesser degree, suboptimal 
international political outcomes in regional 
settings. Furthermore, given that 
neoclassical realism is very much a problem- 
driven approach, it is a useful tool for offering 
feedback in the form of policy critiques and 
recommendations. Thus, using neoclassical 
realist-informed observations of the West- 
Russia relationship in the context of the 
Ukraine crisis, this article offers three 
plausible scenarios -  an optimal, a 
suboptimal, and a middle-ground 
'pragmatic' scenario -  for the medium to 
long-term trajectory of West-Russia relations.
Optimal scenario
A realistic optimal scenario for the West- 
Russia relationship in the medium term is the 
development of a complementary 
relationship that focuses on the win-win 
potential of trade and energy relations and 
minimises the fear and antagonism of the 
diverging security preferences of the two key 
Western institutions (the EU and NATO) and 
Russia. Therefore, such a scenario is
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predicated on the EU, NATO and Russia 
agreeing on a security architecture for 
Eastern Europe. From Russia's perspective, 
for a new security architecture to be agreed, 
NATO would have to unequivocally rule out 
further expansion eastwards and the EU give 
up its putative quest for a unipolar Europe 
based on its norms and values (Haukkala, 
2015). Incidentally, both EU and NATO 
membership remain key aspirations for the 
Poroshenko government in Ukraine (The 
Telegraph, 2017). However, neither the EU 
nor NATO has -  in response to Poroshenko's 
statements -  explicitly ruled out Ukrainian 
membership in their institutions the future. 
From the EU and NATO's perspective, a 
security compromise with Russia would only 
be palatable if Russia agreed to rethink its 
conceptualisation of being the hegemon of 
its near abroad and allow 'joint management' 
of Eastern European security. Joint 
management would essentially allow the 
countries caught in the shared 
neighbourhood -  Belarus, Moldova and 
Ukraine -  to be independent of Russia's 
overbearing shadow, allowing them to have 
close ties with the West if they so choose.
4 Incidentally, at the 1989 Malta Summit, the West and 
the Soviet Union tentatively agreed a post-Cold War 
security architecture for Eurasia which balanced 
power on the continent; a situation where both sides 
agreed not to pursue any hegemonic goals. However, 
when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, this security
Such a compromise has not seemed 
remotely possible since Russia's first push to 
reclaim its near abroad hegemony in the 
mid-2000s (Noutcheva, 2017). In addition to 
the two security compromises mentioned 
above that an optimal scenario would 
necessitate, solving the Crimean conundrum 
and the separatist movements in the 
Donbass would probably also be obligatory 
pre-requisites to a binding security 
architecture being agreed.
If a complementary security architecture 
could be found between the EU/NATO and 
Russia, likely an architecture built upon a 
bipolar balance of power (with the West and 
Russia representing the two clear -  equal -  
poles), it would allow the relationship to be 
rebuilt on positive-sum foundations 
(Rynning, 2015).4 An EU-Russia free trade 
agreement would be the ultimate tool to 
recalibrating the relationship towards 
cooperation and partnership. Although such 
an agreement seems largely fanciful in the 
current climate, as recently as late 2014, 
Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, 
stated that Russia would be interested in 
creating a "unified economic and
agreement was abandoned and the West -  through its 
two main European institutions, the EU and NATO -  
asserted a normative, economic and security 
hegemony over Eurasia, at the expense of the largest 
country, Russia.
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humanitarian space from Lisbon to 
Vladivostok" through linking the EU and the 
Eurasian Economic Union (The Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 
2014). Furthermore, despite a significant 
drop in trade flows between the EU and 
Russia, Russia is still the EU's fourth largest 
trading partner while the EU remains Russia's 
number one trade partner (European 
Commission, 2017a). Furthermore, such a 
setting would also have positive implications 
in the areas of energy, mobility, transport, 
education and even security and defence 
relations while allowing the "common 
spaces" initiative to return to the fore of EU- 
Russian relations and the United States to re­
commence its Asian pivot.
For such an optimistic scenario to unfold, 
significant changes are required in the West- 
Russia relationship. Firstly, both the West and 
Russia need to better understand one 
another. Such an outcome would firstly need 
Western actors (especially the EU and NATO) 
and Russia to make changes to their identity- 
perceptions frameworks. The West's putative 
civilising mission (evident in the role 
identities of the EU and NATO) would need to 
be softened to accept that pursuing 
hegemony -  whether political, economic or 
normative -  in Eastern Europe is not only 
unrealistic, it is also undesirable as it risks an
escalating security dilemma (and even 
conflict) with Russia. This is not to say that the 
EU should abandon its economic, political, or 
normative focus or that NATO should 
abandon its security role, but rather they 
should widen the scope of their policy­
making to acknowledge Russia's power 
position in Eastern Europe. This would mean 
the EU would accept that Russia has 
legitimate interests in its near abroad and 
that, subsequently, pursuing zero-sum 
policies there is detrimental to European 
security. For Russia, its Eurasian great power 
identity was clearly a source of its assertive 
and, at times, belligerent foreign policy 
responses to changes in the triangle (Smith, 
2017a). Refocusing the Eurasian hegemon 
aspect of its identity, while keeping its great 
power focus, would be a prudent way for 
Russia to soften its role identity toward 
Ukraine and the West. This would allow the 
key Western actors to have legitimate 
interests in Eastern Europe and for Ukraine 
(and the other states of the neighbourhood) 
to have a relatively independent foreign 
policy, both of which would minimise the 
threat perceptions at the heart of Russia's 
foreign policy-making.
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Suboptimal scenario
Some pessimistic suboptimal (extreme 
worst-case) scenarios that have been raised 
for the broader West-Russia relationship 
envisage a grave escalation of contention 
and acrimony to the point where war, even 
nuclear war, between Russia and NATO could 
erupt (Kaplan, 2016; Majumdar, 2016). Given 
Russia's propensity to sabre rattle and use 
strong rhetoric as well as undertake actual 
interventions in Ukraine, coupled with 
NATO's retaliatory posturing in Central- 
Eastern Europe, it is unsurprising that many 
have interpreted these developments as 
potential first steps on the pathway to out- 
and-out military conflict. However, such a 
scenario is mostly farfetched as neither 
Russia nor NATO probably has an appetite for 
escalation to the point of war between the 
two, because such an outcome clearly tilts 
the cost-benefit analysis of both too far 
towards the cost direction.
A more plausible suboptimal scenario is that 
something of a New Cold War -  albeit a 
smaller and more localised version than the 
original Cold War -  emerging in Eastern 
Europe (and potentially the Middle East if
divergence continues over issues such as 
Syria and Yemen). Such a setting would not 
have an agreed security architecture, which, 
like the original Cold War, would make the 
threat of military confrontation appear 
imminent and precipitate a security dilemma 
and an arms race between both sides.5 
Indeed, Cold War-style paranoia and anxiety 
have ostensibly returned to the West-Russia 
relationship, especially in those countries in 
the vicinity of the Ukraine crisis, and could 
escalate further (Smith, 2017b). Russia has 
increased its projection of military power 
towards the West, most notably through its 
undertaking of numerous exercises around 
the Kaliningrad oblast; the recent Zapad 
2017 exercise involved as many as 100,000 
personnel (Sukhankin, 2017). Conversely, 
NATO has similarly ramped up the size and 
number of exercises on its Eastern border -  
albeit not to the scale of Russia -  as well as 
creating the Very High Readiness Joint Task 
Force (VJTF) -  a "Spearhead Force" for rapid 
protection against threats to NATO member 
states sovereignty -  for the member states 
closest to Russia (Abts, 2015).6 However, 
despite this clear increase in tension since the 
Ukraine crisis, the global threat embodied by
5 David Lake (2009, 61), in his assessment of the architecture, which makes the region "highly
different types of regional security complexes argues competitive and conflict prone."
that the most unstable is a bipolar regional setting, 6 The VJTF currently comprises four battalions
especially one which has no agreed security stationed in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland.
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the original Cold War will not return to the 
broader West-Russia relationship.7 
Nevertheless, in such an environment, the 
predominately beneficial trade and energy 
relations that characterised the EU-Russia 
relationship for the first 15 years of the post­
Cold War era would be eradicated and 
replaced with out-and-out mercantilism, 
with trade and energy used purely for 
statecraft. The deterioration of the 
relationship to a point where no cooperation 
exists and clear security divergences 
between the great powers reign would have 
the potential to essentially rip the shared 
neighbourhood of Eastern Europe in half -  a 
process which has arguably already started. 
Thus, hypothetically, in Ukraine, Crimea, the 
Donbass region, and potentially Bessarabia 
would represent a "Novorossiya" bloc of 
Ukraine that would be fully aligned, if not 
incorporated, within Russia, with the rest of 
Ukraine becoming an entirely Western- 
facing state (Toal, 2017). For the remaining 
two states, Belarus would likely become even 
more entrenched within Russia's sphere and 
Moldova would likely move closer to the EU 
(although further complications arise there
7 The Cold War became a globally significant contest 
largely because it involved the two clear poles of a 
bipolar international setting. While the West-Russia 
relationship could return to similar levels of
given the role of Russia in the breakaway 
state of Transnistria).
A suboptimal scenario like this will be born 
from increased dissonance and confusion. 
Therefore, for this to occur, threat 
perceptions of all involved would likely have 
to become more anxious and paranoid. The 
West would strengthen its putative policy of 
subordinating Russia through exploiting an 
array of power dimensions -  such as 
economic, normative, and soft power -  while 
simultaneously remaining unwilling to 
understand Russia's anxieties and fears 
(Sakwa, 2015). This would mean that NATO 
would continue to build progressive 
relationships with the countries in the shared 
neighbourhood while keeping the prospect 
of future membership firmly on the table. 
Additionally, the EU would maintain its 
Eastern Partnership policy in a continued 
attempt to Europeanise its eastern frontiers 
while not explicitly ruling out future 
membership for those countries. At the same 
time, Russia's Eurasian great power identity 
could strengthen further which would 
increase their perceptions of NATO and the 
EU -  under the putative control of the United 
States -  as representing anti-Russian
antagonism, the global setting (now an emerging 
multipolar world) has changed significantly, especially 
with the Rise of China and India and Russia's terminal 
decline (Smith, 2017b).
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imperialist forces (Forsberg and Pursiainen, 
2017). This would make Russia's foreign 
policy decision-making for its near abroad 
and Ukraine -  which would become a 'make- 
or-break' national interest -  even more 
pessimistic and zero-sum, ruling out any 
opportunity for compromise and raising the 
potential for more conflict.
Pragmatic scenario
A third scenario, one which is situated 
somewhere between the optimal and 
suboptimal ones presented above (thus, a 
"pragmatic" option) is that the shared 
neighbourhood, especially Ukraine, becomes 
a buffer region between the EU/NATO and 
Russia. Although this scenario is perhaps the 
closest to the current impasse, if such a 
scenario is to eventuate as a medium-term 
outcome a tacitly agreed security 
architecture would still be required as a 
safeguard from the relationship descending 
into the suboptimal scenario presented 
above. Therefore, the security architecture 
would be a loose agreement on the bipolar 
nature of Eastern Europe and that the shared 
neighbourhood would represent, at least on 
paper, a no-go zone regarding security
interests. Indeed, such an outcome has 
become popular in the discourse -  
championed by luminaries such as Brzezinski 
(2014) and Kissinger (2014) -  and has been 
coined the Finlandisation approach as it has 
similarities with the security compromise the 
United States and the Soviet Union made 
concerning Finland's positioning during the 
Cold War.8
The problem of this suggested pragmatic 
solution is that it would officially render 
Ukraine, as well as Belarus and Moldova, 
passive and without agency in the triangle; 
essentially, they would cede much of their 
external sovereignty in return for stability. 
While this is understandably a hard sell to 
those countries, to what degree these 
countries had any real agency in the 
relationship prior to the deterioration of 
West-Russia relations is debatable, especially 
if you view sovereignty as relative, not 
absolute. In addition to reduced sovereignty, 
the questions of Crimea and Donbass would 
likely remain open and unsolved, with the 
former remaining a part of Russia and the 
latter becoming a frozen conflict. 
Furthermore, there is fear that Russia could 
use the frozen conflict to exude indirect 
influence over Ukraine, which has been its
8 Although, in reality, Finlandisation was a begrudging 
bandwagon of the Soviet Union by Finland more than
a coherent agreement by the United States and the 
Soviet Union (Walt, 1985).
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modus operandi in Georgia since the early 
1990s where Russia backs two breakaway 
regions: South Ossetia and Abkhazia
(Mankoff, 2014). Indeed, although Finland 
was officially a non-aligned buffer state 
during the Cold War, in practice, the Soviet 
Union exerted a significant amount of 
influence -  certainly more than the United 
States -  over Helsinki. On a more positive 
note, this scenario would not only pacify 
some of the underpinning security threats 
but also likely see a halt to the rapidly 
diminishing trade links between the EU and 
Russia (total trade diminished by 43% from 
2012 to 2016) and Russia and Ukraine (total 
trade diminished by 76% from 2012 to 2016). 
Furthermore, a Finlandisation-style 
agreement could potentially stabilise Russia- 
Ukraine energy relations -  which have 
ceased to exist since Russia stopped 
supplying gas to Ukraine in late 2015 -  which 
would also have implications for the strained 
(but still lucrative) EU-Russia energy 
relationship (Siddi, 2017). Importantly, 
however, this scenario would not create an 
environment conducive to pursuing 
cooperation like the optimal scenario 
presented above. Rather, it would merely 
stabilise relations, providing a bulwark
against deterioration of the relationship 
towards a suboptimal scenario.
For this pragmatic scenario to eventuate, 
both the West and Russia would need to 
agree that the potential for the suboptimal 
scenario -  a New Cold War -  is undesirable 
and put in place some agreements, whether 
formal or informal, to protect against further 
deterioration of the relationship towards it. 
Finding basic common ground, probably 
through embracing the pragmatic feedback 
on offer from the crisis to date, would be a 
key component of this scenario eventuating.9 
Furthermore, the identity-perceptions 
frameworks of the EU and NATO and Russia 
would need some alteration to alleviate the 
prevalent misunderstanding and confusion 
(as outlined in the section about the optimal 
scenario), although not to the extent 
required for the optimal scenario. The EU and 
NATO would need to recognise that Russia is 
insecure about Western encroachment and is 
prepared to respond in a strong and swift 
manner when its perceived national interest 
is threatened. Indeed, some EU member 
states -  including Italy, Hungary, Slovakia 
Greece, and Cyprus, and, to a lesser extent, 
France and Germany -  have iterated that 
they are open to ending sanctions against
9 Wohlforth and Zubok (2017) outline in more detail 
the steps which would have to be taken by the West
and Russia to enable a pragmatic compromise 
between the two.
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Russia and ultimately covet some form of 
strategic partnership in the long term 
(Tamkin, 2017). However, countries such as 
Poland and the Baltic three, and to a lesser 
extent the United Kingdom, are strongly 
against an end to sanctions and any idea of a 
strategic partnership, and, in fact, lobby for 
harsher policies against Russia -  making the 
EU's chance for a coherent position difficult. 
Conversely, Russia would need to recognise 
that while the key Western actors have not 
been prepared to punish them that severely 
for their aggressive action in Ukraine to date, 
beyond sanctions and ostracization, the 
long-term success of its Ukraine actions is 
less than guaranteed. The ongoing cost of 
sanctions and international ostracisation 
have hurt Russia somewhat -  although 
Russia seems more susceptible to low oil 
prices -  and when coupled with Russia's 
apparent terminal decline, its long-term 
outlook is bleak (Movchan, 2017). 
Incidentally, Vladimir Putin recently 
submitted a draft resolution to the United 
Nations Security Council to send a 
peacekeeping mission to patrol the ongoing 
conflict in the Donbass region of eastern 
Ukraine, perhaps demonstrating a more 
diplomatic stance, although few are 
prepared to buy Russia's sincerity at this 
stage (Coyle, 2017).
Which scenario is the most likely?
Given that the Ukraine crisis and the cooling 
of West-Russia relations has come about due 
to the prevalence of zero-sum policies, not 
only by Russia but the West, predicting the 
future trajectory comes down to which side, 
if any, is most willing to make concessions on 
their policies. Indeed, each of the purported 
scenarios, save for the suboptimal scenario, 
requires some form of concession and 
ultimately probably benefits one power over 
the other, with a silver bullet win-win 
scenario largely fanciful.
Regarding the optimal scenario, the West, 
especially the EU, would probably accept a 
scenario like this as being preferable to the 
other actors because it would allow them to 
prosper in the trade and energy 
relationships. Furthermore, this scenario 
would significantly minimise the security risk 
presented by an aggressive Russia looking to 
challenge the EU's presence in Eastern 
Europe, although it would, conversely, 
require the West, especially the EU, to shelve 
its ambitious normative policies for Eastern 
Europe and accept Russia as an equal. Russia 
would consider a scenario like this as a large 
concession and probably against its 
perceived national interest of being the 
unquestioned hegemon of its near abroad.
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However, this scenario is still preferable for 
Russia to the threat of having the West 
pursue a strategy of asserting its Eastern 
European hegemony as it would elevate 
Russia to an even standing with the EU and 
NATO, something it has desired for some 
time.
Regarding the suboptimal scenario, there 
would be few winners in this scenario. Russia, 
undoubtedly, of the main actors would 
perceive such a result as being the most 
palatable as it would fit in line with their 
perceived vital national interest of having 
Ukraine unaligned with the West while 
challenging the Western-centric security 
architecture of Eastern Europe to assert 
Russia's great power status and postion as a 
regional hegemon. However, at the same 
time, the price to achieve this would be grave 
and place immense pressures on Putin's 
regime and Russia's internal situation, which 
has already been undermined by ongoing 
economic strife. None of the Western actors 
involved would desire a scenario like this in 
Eastern Europe. The West seems to have zero 
political will to head down this pathway: the 
United States has become somewhat uneasy 
as a security guarantor for NATO's Eastern 
members while the EU's ineptitude in all 
things geopolitics would render it practically 
useless in such a scenario.
Regarding the pragmatic scenario, this 
would arguably represent a more favourable 
outcome for Russia while being less so for the 
EU and Ukraine. For Russia, this result would 
fall short of their initial aims in Ukraine but 
nevertheless give them assurances that 
Ukraine's desired Western future would be 
halted while also enabling some minor 
reconciliation of its relationship with the 
West; most notably an end to sanctions and 
ostracisation. Furthermore, given that the 
prospect of Ukraine re-aligning towards 
Russia is now extremely remote, Russia is 
probably content with having Ukraine 
reduced to a Finland-style buffer state, 
particularly if it keeps control of Crimea and 
props up Luhansk and Donetsk in the 
Donbass region; giving the Kremlin 
insurance if the setting changed rapidly. For 
the West, it would represent a clear 
concession of its ostensible pre-crisis aim of 
having a West-facing Ukraine. However, a 
scenario like this would still represent a 
preferable alternative for the West to the 
suboptimal scenario presented above 
because it would entail the West maintaining 
its dominant economic standing.
Of the three offered scenarios, it is argued 
that the pragmatic scenario represents the 
most likely outcome. This is because Russia's 
foreign policy-making capabilities far
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outstrip that of the EU's and its willingness to 
incur substantial costs in the pursuit of its 
foreign policies has largely pacified the 
involvement of NATO and the United States, 
both of which do not have the same interest 
in raising the stakes over Ukraine. Russia is, 
therefore, arguably the key actor in obtaining 
rapprochement in Eastern Europe as it holds 
many of the necessary cards to finding a 
solution (or is at least the most willing to play 
them). Consequently, when this considered, 
the scenario of having Ukraine reduced to a 
Finland-style buffer state represents the 
most likely scenario not only because it likely 
fits within Russia's notion of acceptable 
outcomes but it is also a tolerable outcome 
for the West and, although it would not be 
celebrated in Ukraine, it would probably 
represent a necessary compromise to ensure 
stability and security -  especially as Ukraine 
has somewhat lost faith in the West in recent 
years.
It should go without saying, but crystal-ball 
gazing has its limitations and predicting 
outcomes in such a complex and multi­
layered relationship is fraught with 
difficulties. Nevertheless, at the very least, the 
three offered scenarios represent the three 
broad directions in which the relationship 
should develop in the near future. Indeed, 
the presented likely pragmatic scenario
suggests that Russia will end up with 
arguably the most advantageous outcome of 
the examined actors in the relationship. 
Certainly, Russia has proven to be agile in 
pursuing its interests in Ukraine,
demonstrating a greater appreciation of the 
geopolitics of the Eastern Europe security 
complex as well as some success in calling 
the West's bluff. However, Russia's apparent 
position of power in deciding Ukraine's (and 
perhaps Eastern Europe's) fate is not without 
its weaknesses. Russia's strategies, to date, 
have been notably short-term in focus with 
its long-term game less than assured, 
especially when the costs associated with its 
actions are factored in amidst the more 
general decline Russia has been 
experiencing.
Russia's apparent short-term bargaining 
power in engineering an advantageous 
outcome in Eastern Europe could also be 
further pacified if the West can demonstrate 
not only resilience but also a deeper 
commitment to Eastern European security. 
While such a development seems 
questionable right now -  especially with the 
United States seemingly disinterested in 
NATO and European security in general 
under Trump and the EU facing several 
existential crises which place the very future 
of the institution in d o u b t- it is still possible
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that Western Europe emerges out of these 
crises in a stronger position (Leonard, 2017). 
Indeed, Germany's apparent willingness to 
play a stronger security role, perhaps in 
spearheading greater security integration 
beyond NATO while also, along with the 
French, promoting deeper EU integration 
post-Brexit, could produce a stronger and 
more cohesive check against Russia (Spohr, 
2017). However, even if the bargaining 
power advantage was to switch from Russia 
to the West in the near future, a better 
understanding of Russia (same goes for 
Russia's understanding of the West) and of 
the geopolitics of Eastern Europe is a pre­
requisite to forging a more optimal outcome. 
Until that happens, the West-Russia 
relationship will continue to move towards 
the pragmatic scenario while the more 
extreme optimal and suboptimal scenarios 
will periodically appear as distinct 
possibilities. Although neither side probably 
wants the descent of the crisis towards a New 
Cold War, such an outcome could happen if 
no amendments are made to the identity- 
perceptions frameworks of the various 
powers. Identity and perceptions are often 
hard to change and the confusion and 
misunderstanding at the heart of the West- 
Russia relationship has been there for 
centuries. Therefore, striving for the optimal 
scenario, despite it appearing as the least
likely of the stated scenarios while protecting 
against the suboptimal should rationally 
remain a focus of the West and Russia, 
otherwise a lose-lose suboptimal outcome 
could be a distinct possibility.
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